Talking about Once Upon a Time in Punchbowl: rescuing Lebanese honour from shame?

The Conversation    Once Upon a Time in Punchbowl: SBS

Mediterranean societies have been described as communities of honour and shame. The fundamental currency of their social order is respect. When the Lebanese civil war, which began in 1975, drove thousands of its citizens to seek refuge in Australia, a moral economy of respect travelled with them. 

 This moral economy confronted a society not ready to receive the migrants; nor were they expecting what they found. The story of the sometimes fraught relationship of Lebanese immigrants, their children and Australian society underpins SBS and Northern Pictures’ four-part series Once Upon a Time in Punchbowl.

 In the midst of Australia’s confusion in 1976 over how it should or could respond to people fleeing crises, the Fraser government put together a Lebanese concession that eased restrictions applying to normal immigration applications, especially in relation to employment skills, language and assimiliabity.

Over the next four years around 20,000 Lebanese arrived in Australia, just under half Muslim (mainly Sunni but also Shia from the south), joining a Lebanese Arabic community that had been until then overwhelming Christian with smaller Druze and Alawi groups. 

As a government report of the day shows, many of the refugees from rural parts of Lebanon were poorly educated, and lacked skills necessary for work in Australia. They were often traumatised by the war, and had often lost family and homes in the back-and-forth movement of forces. They also entered the country as industrial employment opportunities were contracting, and investment in education was being reduced.

 As a result, the conditions were put in place that would lead to significant and growing frictions with the wider Australian society, especially for a minority that would become more marginalised and alienated.

 These initial conditions of settlement were not to be resolved. Sociological research suggests that in the first period of immigrant settlement all is chaos, and the first things to get organised are crime and religion. Each struggles for the hearts, minds, money, fears and hopes of people setting out on new lives. 

By 1977, the first Lebanese Sunni mosque was established in Lakemba in Sydney’s southwest, but there were also signs that both the longer-established Christians and the newly arrived Muslims were generating what would become significant criminal networks. There is some evidence that it was the Christian-background criminals who were moving in on Sydney’s lucrative Kings Cross drug trade that were recruiting Muslim-background youth from the western suburbs to provide muscle, and deal the drugs at street level. 

 This latter group would later break away – or be forced out – and build its own black economy in Punchbowl around Telopea St and Punchbowl Park. Meanwhile, the same generation of refugee Vietnamese youth was doing much the same in Cabramatta, a few suburbs away.

The Lebanese story has been marked by moments of public crisis, and these have served as the backbone for the Once Upon a Time in Punchbowl narrative. The 1991 Gulf War, where anti-Arab racism was widespread in public and media reactions to the conflict, confronted the Lebanese with questions about their loyalty to Australia. As during World War Two when Australia interned thousands of Italians, many of whom were citizens, paranoia about the enemy within was widespread. This had a major impact on a generation of young people who had been promised they were both Arab and Australian in contemporary multiculturalism, but were now told they had to choose.  This period marked the first major upsurge in anti-Arab sentiment.

By 1993 tensions, especially in southwest Sydney, were growing between police and young people. Facing an education system that had systemically failed many of them, facing mainstream racism and being drawn into alternative ways of gaining respect in criminal networks, some found a certain freedom and respect in a world of drug use.  In October police attacked a group of young people at an Arabic community picnic, using dogs and batons to break up what they later claimed was a riot. Later inquiries supported community claims of police racism.

 The situation deteriorated further with the rise of Hansonism in the mid-to-late 1990s.

Into the midst of these local events came a series of new global crises involving Australians – the September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, the murders of Australians among others by jihadists in Bali in 2002, and the 2003 invasion of  Iraq in which Australia was also involved.  Each event set up the enemy as either Arab or Muslim or both, and with the largest single group of Muslim Arabs in Sydney coming from Lebanon, despite their not being involved in any of these events, they became the proxy target.

These events also introduced into the Australian mix a new dimension, radical jihadism. Some young people found in the increasingly militant language of  some minority Islamist preachers the promise of new meaning and a form of ego-asserting salvation. Imbued with a masculinist discourse which confronted the demeaning racisms that had undermined the perceived honour of men for generations, many were drawn to the space in which faith could be sometimes used not to reassert a Muslim identity within Australian society, but rather assert a new identity against Australian society and the wider targets of jihadism. 

A more volatile situation could be hard to design. It boiled over in December 2005, when spurred on by Sydney radio shock-jock Alan Jones, Cronulla beach became the scene for savage attacks on anyone of Middle Eastern appearance.  That evening young men gathered at Punchbowl Park and moved east in convoys, retaliating against those symbols of the other Australia that had so debased them. The RSL at Brighton–le-Sands, cars and shops in Maroubra, Anglo-looking men walking along the darkened streets of the eastern suburbs, all became targets for revenge.

Out of that conflict arose a new determination by the mainstream Lebanese Muslim community to assert a right to be seen as part of Australian society.  This took on a number of forms, from the conservative to the deviant.

Once Upon a Time in Punchbowl tells this story and others through the eyes of those who have lived it. If anything is clear it is that the politics of respect has to be rescued from those who have turned it toxic, and that the perpetrators exist on all sides.

Aleksandra Hadzelek explores the debate about Generation War: we recently published on this issue of Poland’s historical memory of its Jewish past

Our joint article is in Holocaust Studies Autumn 2013.

(From The Conversation 31 January 2014)

Polish reactions to the German TV series Generation War, which has just screened in Australia, confirm that the history of World War Two remains highly contentious. The resulting public debate tested Polish-German and Polish-Jewish relations and placed historical memory at the forefront of the disputes.

The series first aired in Germany last March. It told the story of five young Germans in the 1940s who, as German newspaper Der Spiegel put it, “lose their innocence without being malicious”. The broadcasts contributed to Germany’s ongoing re-assessment of its past, especially among post-war generations.

The series inevitably raised questions about the responsibility of ordinary Germans for the crimes of the Nazi regime. More specifically, questions were asked about these depictions on public television in a historic drama miniseries, which was sure to attract a wide audience.

The reactions in Poland focused less on Germans being presented as likeable human beings caught in the war than on Poles being portrayed as anti-Semites. Such depictions (in only a few secondary scenes) led the director of Polish public television, Juliusz Braun, to fire off a protest to the German TV station. His letter objected to the injurious and false simplifications of the historical image of Poland, which could not be justified by the creators’ artistic freedom.

Protests by Polish public organisations led a month later to the government issuing an official letter of protest signed by the Polish ambassador to Germany. The Polish embassy in Washington protested at plans to broadcast the series in the US.

The news in August that the BBC would air the series caused another uproar in Poland. The sizeable Polish community in the UK held protests against screening “a film slandering the Polish Home Army”.

 

A poster reading, in Polish, “New provocation! New manipulation! New Europe?” objects to the German TV miniseries Generation War. PAP

 

In Poland, the broadcasts on three consecutive evenings last June was preceded by an aggressive drumming up of expectations of controversy about a German director’s negative depiction of Poles. It was difficult to watch the series without anticipating those most “controversial” bits. These became the focus of a debate aired live after the last episode.

In an ironic turn of events, Juliusz Braun was heavily criticised for screening the series on public television in Poland. The leading Polish right-wing party, Law and Justice, demanded his immediate resignation. The Polish Anti-Defamation League contacted the Attorney-General’s Warsaw office to report a crime of “public slandering of the Polish nation”.

Why has this series caused such a strong reaction in Poland and among Polish diaspora around the world?

Power of the myth

In the post-war Soviet takeover of Poland, the Polish Home Army was dismantled. Its members were vilified, persecuted and executed (or otherwise exiled for life). For many generations of Poles, the Home Army soldiers came to symbolise honour and ultimate sacrifice in the fight for freedom.

Accepting that the Home Army was anti-Semitic would go against the myth of the glorious Polish soldier and survivor. The notion of martyrdom that this evokes, centuries-old and all-important in the Polish imaginary, is always accompanied by tales of heroism.

In this TV series, instead of heroes, we see a bunch of dirty and primitive bandits who commit very questionable acts and display questionable attitudes.

Historical truth

Since 1989 Poland has sought to recover the “historical truth” after half a century of Soviet propaganda. Contemporary Poles, who in their vast majority rejected the Soviet version of history, have been engaged heavily in making public the “real historical truth” – the version of history silenced by the pro-Soviet regime. Truth about the Katyn massacre is a perfect example.

However, within this project of rewriting the national history, it is difficult to fit in multiple interpretations and varying viewpoints, especially on the most sensitive topics.

 

 

Victims and perpetrators

Generation War’s five main characters are portrayed as young, idealistic and somewhat naïve. The experiences of the war lead them to certain actions that might be questionable, but, as in any film or TV series, the viewer cares about and feels for them.

The implicit message is that these were the average Germans. Caught in the enthusiasm for the war project without being ideologically involved with Nazism, when faced with harsh reality they were forced to act as they did by circumstances and not by their own will.

The character of the SS officer does not in itself balance the overall impression that the main German characters are almost the victims of the war and not the perpetrators.

Among non-German characters, on the other hand, the Polish Home Army soldiers are probably the least sympathetic of all. In the scenes that most outraged the Polish public, they are simply repugnant and framed almost as perpetrators of the Holocaust.

This is an issue so sensitive in Poland that after US president Barack Obama referred to “Polish death camps” in 2012, heformally apologised for the “inadvertent verbal gaffe”. Obama acknowledged that these were, in fact, Nazi camps located on German-occupied Polish territory.

Polish anti-Semitism

So, were/are Poles anti-Semitic or not? Well, yes and no. The fury over the TV series confirms that this issue remains highly problematic.

It is difficult to accept expressions such as “Polish death camps”, with its implicit message that these were Polish-orchestrated and operated. It is equally difficult to accept that there were no anti-Semites in the Polish Home Army, or anti-Jewish crimes committed by Poles. Poles were victims of the Nazi terror, but some Poles also perpetrated anti-Jewish violence. Neither one nor the other can be denied.

A fully accurate re-examination of this chapter of history will be impossible. This is because of the unreliability of primary sources from the WWII-era, due to the age of first-hand witnesses, as well as Soviet authorities’ heavy postwar manipulation of the collecting and archiving of testimonies. Thus the goal for the historians will be to engage younger generations in a constructive dialogue by carefully considering multiple viewpoints and experiences.

The national project of rewriting Polish history ought to have room for a re-evaluation of Polish attitudes towards the Jews. Poland should seek a reconciliation with this difficult chapter of the past and ultimately a celebration of a 1000-year Polish Jewish history so that, as Michael Gawenda wrote, the story doesn’t have to end in a cemetery.

Brandis’s Gotcha! IPA’s Tim Wilson the new voice of freedom?

See also edited version on The Conversation

There is something both utterly predictable and wonderfully larrikin about Attorney General Brandis’ appointment of the Institute for Public Affairs’  self-described “classic liberal” Tim Wilson to the vacant Human Rights Commissioner post at the Australian Human Rights Commission. In a “gotcha” moment reminiscent of an undergrad poker game, Brandis saw and raised former ALP Attorney General Mark Dreyfus’ appointment of Labor intellectual Dr Tim Soutphammasane to the Race Discrimination Commissioner job, an appointment he had excoriated in the pages of The Australian while in Opposition.   So now we have the two young Tims facing off at each other, Wilson having been the main architect of Brandis’ push to chop the Racial Vilification provisions (Section 18C) from the Race Discrimination Act, and Soutphammasane the main defender of the rights under those provisions.  Here we see the “me” generation” confront the “we” generation in a fundamental test of the vision for freedom – as a personal versus a social phenomenon.

In one swift move Brandis has dragged the HRC into a very modern moment, with Wilson the gay advocate of LGBTI aggression against all comers, strong supporter of same-sex marriage (for the best of conservative reasons including no taxation without representation)   and valiant defender of Andrew Bolt, circling the space inhabited by the ranks of anti-hate speech activists. Last week over 150 organisations signed on to an open letter to Brandis pleading to save Section 18C. Every one of them would have been red rags to the IPA bulls.

Tim Wilson is well known to the chattering classes, being a fixture on the ABC (“in the name of balance”?) and an ardent opponent of Climate Change and Global Warming.  He describes himself as “currently completing a Graduate Diploma in Climate Science and Global Warming at Murdoch University.” Wilson was first amongst equals in arguing for the end of the Climate Change Commission (one of the first ten IPA victories with the new Abbott regime), king-hitting that third Tim, Dr Flannery, in the process.

While his education has pushed him towards international development and health issues (he is a strong opponent of health labels and limiting the freedom of people to eat, drink, and get very merry), he is also a favoured son of the Murdoch empire, having been anointed by The Australian as one of ten emerging leaders (2009) and been gifted with an Australian Davos Connection leadership award. His formal position at the IPA has been as Director of the Climate policy Unit, where he has been a strong supporter of Lord Christopher Monckton, a global warming denialist.

He presents then a very interesting mix, someone who argues for policy to reflect political values, and be informed by evidence, rather than determined by evidence. He has no problem in arguing that the values he represents and advocates should be placed at the heart of the Australian human rights agenda. Now what indeed might that mean?

Brandis has pointed him at the International Civil and Political Rights convenant as his first landing field. The ICCPR is a complex document but it does rub right up against the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). In hailing him, Brandis foregrounded Wilson’s role in “thwarting recent attempts to erode freedom of speech, freedom of the press and artistic freedom”.  So here we can see the Andrew Bolt case (Wilson and Bolt  form a mutual admiration society), and the attempt by the ALP to regulate the media that ended in a complete shambles under Senator Stephen Conroy’s ham-fisted intervention, though artistic freedom is a bit more obscure. Perhaps a desire to confront Kevin Rudd and back Malcolm Turnbull over the Bill Henson affair in 2008? At that time the IPA (though not Wilson himself as far as I can tell) came out in strong support for Henson and even Serrano’s Piss Christ.   That should be an interesting conversation among the boys in Cabinet.

So what are the classic human freedom issues that Wilson will need to address? A former HR Commissioner, Sev Ozdowski, himself today a supporter of Andrew Bolt *and advocate of removing Section 18C, brought down an important report on the human rights of children in detention in 2004. It had some short-term impact on focussing the Immigration minister of the day on his duty of care for minors. This may be back on the agenda a decade later with the tales of multiple still-births and neo-natal deaths among detainees starting to emerge. So Wilson could do a revisit there, and include something on the right to life.

Freedom of speech is another good one. He could check out what sort of freedoms should be allowed journalists who fake stories in the The Australian to bolster the political agenda of Senator Brandis.  In this case (9 December 2013) journalist Joe Kelly wrote a story about a delegation of community groups which had met with Brandis to protest his moves to remove 18C: the headline was “Brandis wins approval for changes in RDA”.  The delegation was outraged and the The Australian pulled the piece.

But perhaps his main task will be, as it was at the IPA, to ensure that all the bits of the neo-liberal agenda can be held together, on a paltry $320,000 pa +. Given the difficulty the Government seems to be having in doing so, Mr Wilson may give them some well-needed taxpayer-funded support.

_____________________

  • * Conversation started 18 November

18/11/2013 02:53

Andrew Jakubowicz

We need to act to stop the licensing of hate speech proposed by the new Australian Government. You can help by signing on to the petition and telling your friends. Thanks, Andrew.

http://chn.ge/1aLlsdP

  • 8 December
    08/12/2013 21:21

Sev Ozdowski

I think you are wrong. What happens to A Bolt was not fair. A legislative change is needed. Sev

Myanmar’s rocky road to multiculturalism:Aung San Suu Kyi’s challenge

Slightly different version published in ABC The Drum 27 November 2013.

Aung San Suu Kyi will be in Sydney Australia today (27 November 2013)  to receive an honorary doctorate from the University of Technology, originally bestowed on her in 1996 and given to her late husband in 1997 in her absence (she was unwilling to leave Yangon). Daw Suu Kyi is widely expected and hoped to be the winner of the 2015 election in Myanmar, but her accession to the leadership, even if it occurs, leaves many problems yet to confront. Even the pathway over the next eighteen months remains treacherous.

Key issues Myanmar faces in the lead up to the 2015 election, a turning point that many commentators hope will produce a final transformation of the polity into one which is both politically democratic and economically egalitarian, can be traced back to its origin as as an “abandoned colony”.  The Economist recently argued that of these ethnic conflicts were the main road-bloc to economic development and democratic stability.

Myanmar cannot escape its history as a former British colony as easily as changing government. In a statistical analysis of the impact of forms of colonialism on post-colonial violence, two Montreal sociologists Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson  have argued that ex-colonies formerly ruled by the UK have a shared profile of fractured social relations once the colonial power has left. The reason for this is the way in which the British typically organised their colonies, and as importantly, the way in which they departed. Ethnic violence or suppression are the most characteristic of the forms of conflict that emerge. Australia went that way (think Indigenous Australians and think White Australia), as did a myriad of other places, from Singapore to Zimbabwe. Myanmar continues today to deal with the fall-out from having been British Burma.

Lange and Dawson review 160 ex-colonies once ruled by a range of European metropolitan powers: where the British have been in charge, the picture seems to be:

  • a diverse range of ethnic communities, some “imported” to fill key colonial tasks,  with embedded and conflicting identities
  • a political economy where the division of labour is “communalised”
  • a stratification system in which the distinctions within the hierarchy are ethnic in form
  • animosity between indigenous and non-indigenous populations
  • the imposition of arbitrary political borders that suit the ruling power
  • despotic forms of rule
  • ineffective states
  • a power vacuum at independence.

When the post-war British Labour government said to the Burmese independence leaders that they were “out of here” in 1946, they set in train a tragic sequence of events. These are acutely poignant for Aung San Suu Kyi; her father, a wartime leader of the struggle against the British and post-war architect of a possible egalitarian nation state, was assassinated by competitors for state power. His dream, of a united states of Burma, became instead the nightmare of decades of wars and struggles between various ethno-national and sometimes Christian quasi-states on the periphery of the nation, against the Burman Buddhist majority in the centre.  Most recently, as most of these statelets on the edges of the nation have made a sort of peace with the centre, Buddhist violence against Muslims has re-ignited.

When the British finally defeated the last king of the Burmans in 1885 and sent him into exile in India (exchanging him for the last Muslim rajah of India, who was buried in an unmarked grave in Rangoon), they significantly transformed the country through manipulation of ethnic boundaries and the imposition of ethnic hierarchies. Importing thousands of Indians from Bengal and beyond to fill jobs from labourers to clerks in government and business, the colonial power sought to destroy the capacity of the Burmans to resuscitate their defeated kingdom.  They empowered the hill peoples, and enabled the conversion of many to Christianity – Baptists and Catholics found ready converts where economic and political advantage would follow.  The colonial army offered career opportunities to the  Shan, while opium production began to provide monetary rewards in the hill country, as did the logging of the teak forests.

Muslims have been in the territory of Burma since their earliest days as purveyors of their evangelising mercantile religion.  By the time of the first British invasion of 1825 they were well integrated, including as military servants of the King, some captured in raids in Bengal before the British came.  Their numbers increased with the import of Indians and the spread of Bengalis along the coast and through the mountains into the west of Rakhine state (the Rohingya).

Anti-Muslim sentiment was interwoven with British colonial power, with economic competition, and with the support of Muslims for the British against the Japanese in 1942 . The Japanese were initially supported by the Burmese National Army, led by Aung San, in a war of independence against the British, who then pulled back to British Bengal, behind a native defensive shield including Muslim troops.

The contemporary unrest builds on decades of an essentially militarised neo-fascist regime that had locked together Burmese nationalism with Buddhism; its civilian replacement has not entirely escaped that heritage. A specific trigger for anti-Muslim local conflicts in lowland Myanmar came in 2001 the wake of the Taliban destruction of the buddhas of Bamyan in Afghanistan, seen by Burmese Buddhist activists as a sign of the utter treachery of Muslims en bloc. The recent release from prison of a Buddhist monk active in that conflict has provided new leadership and revitalised the movement, with tragic consequences.

The Myanmar nationality law of 1982 contains a very essentialist definition of who can be a citizen. It adopts a jus sanguinis approach, which lists the blood and soil peoples (none that come after the British invasion of 1825 are acceptable). The Rohingya of Rakhine are especially not part of the national story, and are corralled into their edge of the country and prohibited to travel elsewhere. Some Burmese Muslims try to distance themselves from the Rohingya so as to avoid the constraints and the prejudice they fear for themselves. Aung San Suu Kyi has also found the Rohingya a difficult issue, embedded as she is in the ideology of a national Burmese federation of original peoples, promulgated by her father.

In the lead up to their  2015 election, the peoples of Myanmar have some tricky issues to resolve – how to articulate a plural nation that ensures economic equality and opportunity; how to smooth the edges of ethno-national resentments that have the capacity to crack open the whole development story; and how to take the country from the poly-ethnic conflict of the British legacy to a multicultural egalitarian democratic polity based on inclusion and social justice. Critical to this will be how they deine who can be a Myanmar citizen and share in the democratic story. Exclusion of any group may erode the legitimacy of the system for everyone.